A climate diplomat’s retrospective on COPs

Following is an excerpt from The Climate Diplomat, a newly published book by Peter Betts, who draws on this three decades of experience as the UK and EU’s lead climate negotiator. He paints a warts-and-all picture of how world leaders and diplomats tackle the COP negotiations and reflect on his life’s work in the final months of his life.

This book, published by Profile Books, also gives a detailed history of COP, explaining how this controversial and often embattled forum has been crucial in altering the future of our planet’s ecosystem.

Thanks to Australian distributors Allen and Unwin, we have copies of this book to give away to new members of The Fifth Estate. Sign up here.

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Chapter 16: COP and the perils of polarisation

These days, I hear an increasing number of voices questioning the value of COPs and arguing that they achieve nothing. I would challenge that perspective and venture that we are better off as a result of the COP process – which we should keep and complement with other interventions. But there are also changes we could make to deliver more effective progress.

Alongside criticisms of the COP process, political debates about climate change itself continue to rumble on and feel increasingly polarised. Worryingly, the very existence of climate change has frequently been challenged by those on the right, in the US and other English-speaking developed countries in particular. I realise, of course, that you cannot take the politics out of the policies to tackle climate change, but you can take the politics out of whether climate change is happening at all: it is a scientific fact.

Given that fact, there is a pressing need to focus on the pace of implementing policies to tackle climate change. The approach of some on the left who argue that a wealth of other global problems, not least the legacies of colonialism, should also be solved through the prism of climate change, may run the risk of impeding that pace.

It is within this polarised political discourse that the UNFCCC currently operates and sometimes finds itself under attack.

I am as aware as anyone of the shortcomings of COPs. As I’ve made clear throughout this book, it is ultimately crazy that there is no discussion – except in the most general terms – as to whether countries’ individual or collective targets are consistent with temperature goals. And that there are no penalties for non-compliance. But despite its shortcomings, I would simply argue that for now, given the decisive action our remaining carbon budget demands, the COP process is the best system we can secure. Allowing COP to be hijacked by any “culture war” agenda would be a grave mistake.

Perspectives from the right

Over four decades, a significant interest group with a vast stake in the continued production of fossil fuels, principally in the oil and gas industry but also coal producers, have sometimes knowingly disseminated false information about climate change and its causes. They also campaigned vigorously to convince the American people, in particular, that acting on climate change would destroy their way of life. Climatologist Michael Mann documents this thoroughly in his 2021 book The New Climate War.

Some on the right have consistently opposed climate action with arguments that are specious at best and sometimes actively false. One tactic is to take advantage of the complexity of the subject and the impossibility of anyone to be a deep expert in every aspect of the science and policy, from oceanography to carbon trading. This allows them to switch arguments to whatever is most convenient at the time and which their particular interlocutor is least able to rebut. These include arguments that (1) climate change is not happening; (2) it may be happening, but it’s not attributable to human activity; (3) even if it is happening and may indeed be anthropogenic, it is not serious and it is cheaper for us to adapt than to mitigate; (4) the cure (for example, poorly designed or expensive policies to tackle climate change) is worse than the disease; (5) given rising emissions in the developing world, it is pointless the West taking action.

The answers to arguments (1) and (2) and increasingly (3) are overwhelmingly clear (yet these positions are still advanced by so-called reputable commentators). But (4) and (5) can still pose threats to progress.

The cure is worse than the disease

Critics argue that policies to tackle climate change will lead to worse outcomes than climate change itself. This argument was much cited following the increased use of diesel vehicles in the 2000s. There will, of course, be examples of bad policy from time to time: but many policy interventions have dramatically reduced the price of technologies, such as, for example, those on renewable energy and electric vehicles, bringing many co-benefits like improved health and improved energy security.

Other technologies have also fallen in price, above all in passenger transportation, where battery prices have fallen by 89 per cent over the past decade, and electric vehicles are already cheaper on a lifetime-cost basis than internal combustion engine-powered cars although (at the time of writing) are still more expensive on a purchase-price basis.

Other criticisms, such as those made by the Danish author Bjørn Lomborg, argue that the priority should be on addressing today’s poverty and not future climate change. But such critics never explain how you can have economic growth and prosperity amid runaway climate change, with its catastrophic consequences, dislocation and the destruction of agriculture, housing and other infrastructure.

I do not accept such arguments. Given the urgency of the crisis, the most efficient way to reduce emissions is to roll out the technologies we already have, particularly in emerging economies which are increasingly their biggest source.

Action by the West is pointless

Another criticism of COPs by the right (and, in fairness, the left at times too) is that they are talking shops that achieve nothing. The right argues that they merely provide jobs for climate bureaucrats. They argue that COPs are not a mechanism for enabling countries outside Europe to increase the ambition of their targets.

One argument from apparently reputable commentators is that if you count only the reduced emissions from country targets made under the UNFCCC for 2020 and 2030, they make no difference to concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere by 2100, so therefore the targets are useless. This is a specious argument. It is disingenuous to compare reductions in emissions up to 2030 with the entire carbon budget out to 2100. Some jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, have set ambitious targets, and this will affect their emissions trajectory way beyond 2030. Other jurisdictions have set net zero targets for later in the century (for example 2060 in the case of China). The targets in Europe have driven policies at home which have hugely changed the cost of key technologies like renewable energy and have therefore opened up new development paths for developing economies which will enable them to become prosperous while reducing emissions.

I do not think we would have got the overall increase in the ambition of targets without the political focus provided by COPs. Figure 3 on p. 253 shows how the forecast temperature outcomes from countries’ targets fell steadily from Copenhagen to Paris to Glasgow.

It is impossible to prove a counterfactual, but the EU has certainly set tougher targets than it would have done without the UNFCCC process, and the policies to meet these were central in driving the technology changes and knock-on reductions in the price of technology and renewable energy. Other countries have also set tough targets, such as Brazil under President Lula’s first administration, and taken ambitious steps to deliver them. It is true that developed countries outside Europe have pretty much always failed to meet their targets, and the really big emerging economies have tended to set targets less ambitious than business as usual, but the cheaper technologies available as a result of European action and Chinese mass-production manufacturing have changed the direction of business as usual. Without the UNFCCC process, however flawed, leading to that increase in the ambition of country targets, this would not have happened.

Global carbon pricing

A favourite solution of those on the right is a global carbon price. Carbon pricing curbs greenhouse gas emissions by placing a fee on emitting and/or offering an incentive for emitting less. The price signal created shifts in consumption and investment patterns, making economic development compatible with climate protection. There is little prospect that the US, among others, would be capable of delivering this at home, and it has always been fiercely opposed by China and India on the grounds that it is incompatible with common but differentiated responsibilities.

However, the EU has now committed to Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAMs), that is, tariffs on the carbon content of imports, from 2027. At the time of writing, the biggest risk to robust EU action on these tariffs is Germany, which has historically given very high priority to protecting its export markets.

In fairness, CBAMs were also blocked by the UK when it was in the EU. But it is beginning to look like CBAMs might happen regardless: an imputed carbon price could potentially be constructed from US domestic measures in the Inflation Reduction Act, and there are some indications that China might not be as implacably opposed as in the past. It certainly looks as if the possibility of CBAMs is one of the factors driving economies like Indonesia and Vietnam to look harder at decarbonising their economies. This could be an important complementary tool in the locker.

Perspectives from the left

Hearing some left-wing commentators, it can feel hard at times to believe that their real priority is tackling climate change. For them, it appears to provide a rationale for their broader aims of (global) redistribution and grist to their ideological mill that the West – and in particular English-speaking countries – are responsible for all the ills of the world. I am all for looking honestly at (for example) the UK’s past and the ills we committed through the Atlantic slave trade and the empire, but we must do so alongside tackling climate change. The latter is simply too urgent to be paused.

Attributing responsibility for climate change

The position of some on the left on colonialism effectively prevents them from holding up China and other newly developed large emitters to scrutiny. The current public narrative from some on the left on responsibility for climate change, which goes largely unquestioned, runs broadly as follows.

1. Developed countries are largely responsible for the climate problem because of their emissions when they were industrialising.
2. Developed countries have roundly failed in their duty to cut their emissions in the years since the climate problem was identified and have failed to provide sufficient finance.
3. UN negotiations are therefore a straight struggle between developed and developing countries.

Although there is some truth in this narrative, the full story is more complicated, and some elements are wrong. This is important because of the urgent need to be more effective in tackling the problem. The remaining carbon budget for holding warming below an increase of 1.5 °C is around 250 Gt (following latest updates to emissions and methodologies). Inevitably there are uncertainties about these numbers, and even if less pessimistic assumptions are used for the remaining carbon budget they would be blown in less than a decade.

Current NDCs will use up almost all this budget by 2030. Realistically, this means we are almost certain to overshoot 1.5 °C in the early 2030s or a few years later. This is stated baldly in the technical summary of Working Group 3 of the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report, which notes that “Pathways following current NDCs until 2030 … make it impossible to limit warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot and strongly increasing the challenge of limiting warming to 2 °C”.

The stark reality is that, barring unprecedented global action, limiting warming to 1.5 °C without significant overshoot may become an unattainable goal by 2030.

As we grapple with the pressing reality of climate change, these numbers underscore the need for swift and decisive action to curb emissions. Considering how to increase the pace, and effectiveness, with which we tackle the problem requires a clear understanding of ongoing, relative contributions to emissions.

1.     Are developed countries largely responsible for the climate problem because of their emissions when they were industrialising?

While it is true that today’s developed Annex I countries did indeed account for 83 per cent of fossil CO2 between 1850 and 1990, the picture is different if one includes land-based CO2 (that is, emissions from activities like deforestation).

If these were included, it would mean that 64 per cent of overall CO2 before 1990 came from Annex I countries – still the majority of emissions, of course – but this relativises the overall position since some non-Annex I countries, like Brazil, become very high historical per capita emitters, if one includes land-use changes. As a result, about half the carbon budget for 2 °C had been consumed by 1990. This picture becomes clearer when we look at the shifting landscape of climate emissions as illustrated in Figure 5.

According to the Global Carbon Budget 2022, cumulative CO2 emissions, when accounting for land-use change from 1850 to 2021, reveal a significant shift in the relative contributors. For example, by 2021, China notably surpassed the entire EU in its cumulative emissions. This trend exemplifies the shifting landscape of global emissions, where emerging economies have played an increasing role in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, while Annex I countries indisputably dominated emissions in the early phase of industrialisation, the more recent acceleration of emissions from non-Annex I countries, driven by rapid development and urbanisation, is reshaping the global emissions profile. Emissions of developing countries now far outstrip those of developed countries; and the vast bulk of growth in future global emissions will come from these countries.

Looking at absolute emissions is pivotal in understanding the overall impact of a nation in the global emissions framework. Figure 5 shows the annual emissions of key countries from 1990 to 2021. In absolute terms, China’s emissions are now bigger than those of the entire G7.

On this basis, grouping Africa’s least developed countries, the Gulf states and China into a single category of ‘developing countries’ no longer makes sense, and continuing to do so, with the impacts on policies (and politics) that that brings, makes us collectively less effective in mitigating climate change. The whole UNFCCC approach of countries making individual contributions depends on international and domestic political and civil society pressure. If NGOs and the commentariat are silent on the basis of treating developing countries as a homogeneous group, then China, Brazil and the rest have much less reason to act – even though some are both high emitters and very rich, such as many countries in the Gulf.

It is worth noting that developed countries are also heterogeneous, though not as markedly so as developing countries. Most of them are still rich on a per capita basis, as they were in 1992, though some, like Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and Bulgaria, are much poorer than many non-Annex I countries.

2. Have developed countries roundly failed in their duty to cut their emissions in the years since the climate problem was identified?

The (relative) efforts of high-income countries in mitigating their contribution to climate change since 1990 can be seen by the changes in their per capita emissions. Figure 6, benchmarked against 1990 levels, offers a comparative analysis of how these developed countries have progressed over the years. It is a mixed picture. It shows that EU countries have reduced their per capita emissions by around 32 per cent as a whole since 1990.

At the same time, the US has done very little to reduce its emissions in absolute terms, as Figure 5 shows, and where there have been falls, they have been largely attributable to structural changes in the economy. Per capita emissions have fallen, at 28 per cent, which is closer to that of the EU. Other developed countries’ per capita emissions have fallen but only a little: by 7 per cent for Australia, 8 per cent for Japan, and 14 per cent for Canada. In comparison, the UK has reduced its per capita emissions by over 50 per cent.

3. Are UN negotiations therefore a straight struggle between developed and developing countries?

Given the above, it matters that countries such as China and the Gulf states are classified as developing countries, because the developed vs developing narrative becomes the focus, rather than focusing on the role of very big emitters (even if they are classified as developing). This is a real risk. Among other things, it takes the world’s media’s eye off the ball. For example, my good friend Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu of the DRC (Senior Climate Negotiator) was on BBC radio being asked about 1.5 °C and responded that we need more action from developed countries.

That was not challenged. But action from developed countries only will not come close to putting us on track for 1.5 °C and temperature increases above this level will be disastrous for parts of Africa, including the DRC. The focus on the developed vs developing narrative risks clouding constructive debate about the level of contribution to emissions reductions required to reach climate goals.

Stopping oil and gas production immediately

In recent years, the idea that we must stop all oil and gas production immediately has risen up the agenda of the left. However, this is unlikely to deliver dramatic progress.

The vast majority of the world’s oil and gas is produced by state oil companies in countries like Saudi Arabia and Russia. Given that the Saudis’ objective is to be the country providing the last drop of oil to the world, stopping production is unlikely to be persuasive to them. Further, I do not think there is the slightest chance that the world’s biggest consumers like China and India will cooperate and stop playing their lucrative current middleman role for Russian oil.

The real solution to our dependence on fossil fuels is to cut demand. However, it’s worth noting that the IEA’s net zero scenario still has significant amounts of oil and gas consumption in 2030.

It does not call for no more oil and gas investment but instead no new oil and gas fields. It will be very politically and economically risky if we are wholly dependent on Russia and the Middle East for oil and gas in a few years’ time.

So although fundamentally we must address this problem through demand, which we must reduce as quickly as possible, even in 2030, there will be some demand for oil for legacy internal combustion engine vehicles, for aviation and for petrochemicals.

Another energy security crisis where we are dependent on Putin or Mohammed bin Salman or their successors for oil and gas would risk undermining the climate agenda. Of course, we must not overplay the energy security argument, we do not want “energy security washing”. But we should not ignore it either.

I fear that some of the tactics employed by mostly middle-class protesters in the developed world, which often disrupt the day-to-day lives of working people, risk undermining the climate cause.

I do think there is a strong case for rich, developed countries like the US and the UK not to proceed with major new oil and gas developments which risk being locked in for years. The Willow Project in Alaska is a very bad signal, as is the proposed development of the Rosebank oilfield west of Shetland, and further extraction from the Canadian tar sands. But piecemeal investment in existing fields is not so much of a problem. Arguments about fracking will differ from country to country. In the US, where fracking already exists, it is argued that it may not be too bad because it recovers its investment very quickly and wells are exhausted within a short number of years.

However, suggesting that the UK begins to frack at scale (a policy proposal made under the short-lived Truss administration) is a mistake, partly because it is completely impractical, but also because it sends the wrong political signal about a change in direction (compared with countries where it is already an established source).

The think tank Carbon Tracker has done some excellent work looking at the comparative impact of various oil and gas companies’ plans for responding to the climate crisis. Not surprisingly, ExxonMobil comes at the bottom.

COP as a greenwashing forum

Like some of those on the right, some of those on the left also think that COPs are talking shops that achieve nothing. It’s clear that some on the left increasingly feel that the COP process itself has been captured by big business.

Viewed this way, COP is merely a greenwashing exercise for CEOs and executives who are informed by their corporate social responsibility advisors that their presence will send a positive signal to the markets and improve their standing with government.

For example, Greta Thunberg was scathing in her critique of COP at the 2021 Youth4Climate summit, “Build back better. Blah, blah, blah. Green economy. Blah blah blah. Net zero by 2050. Blah, blah, blah”, arguing that “This is all we hear from our so-called leaders. Words. Words that sound great but so far have led to no action. Our hopes and dreams drown in their empty words and promises”’

The answer to such criticisms, as discussed in the previous chapter, is that we need to put in place some norms and guidelines around business targets so we can properly hold them to account and prevent greenwashing. Recent reports (such as that produced following the UN Secretary-General’s intervention in the Glasgow COP) on this subject do not do enough to tackle the problem.

Other perspectives

There are other criticisms of the COP process that are more technocratic. Some argue that there are better ways of securing the outcome of tackling climate change. Many of these voices are well intentioned, such as the recent call from Simon Sharpe, Director of Economics for the Climate Champions Team, for enhanced sectoral cooperation for example on cars or forests on cross-cutting challenges.

Of course, we must have international sectoral cooperation (and there are fora in place to do so, such as the Clean Energy Ministerial, for example), alongside voluntary action by the private sector, but these are not silver bullets either. And even more important to the formal UNFCCC process is that richer countries provide finance and capacity building to developing countries to make the transition.

In short, sectoral cooperation can be combined with the COPs and no one would suggest we rely exclusively on the UNFCCC.

The case for a reformed COP

The perspectives and arguments set out above are often translated into criticisms of the UNFCCC and COP process itself. Of course it has its shortcomings. For example, I would be the first to acknowledge that progress on finance, adaptation and loss and damage has been too slow. But I would argue that it would not have happened at all without the central global discussion afforded by the COPs, at which vulnerable countries always have a strong voice.

The alternative to COPs – often put forward by big and powerful countries – is to do everything within the G20, perhaps complemented by plurilateral cooperation between big states. No one would be more pleased to see the end of the COP process than big oil and gas interests in the US who sought to undermine COPs throughout my decade or more in negotiations.

My experience was that excluding the vulnerable countries led to lower-ambition outcomes which the US and emerging economies were comfortable with. The vast bulk of vulnerable countries would be horrified to lose the COPs, since it guarantees them a voice – the left should be careful what they wish for.

Overall then, I believe that the case for keeping a globalforum, where all have a seat at the table and therefore the most vulnerable have a voice, is overwhelming, and this is the UNFCCC. It is an indispensable political moment every year to rally the forces of ambition for climate change (and, to para- phrase Voltaire, if we didn’t have it, we would need to invent it).

There are however two improvements that could be made to the way COPs operate.

1. The second stocktake

Formal stocktakes occur every five years, at a point two years before the next five-yearly ambition cycles of the COPs (such as Paris and Glasgow). But there is almost no focus by the media or NGOs on the announcements of NDCs, especially those of ‘developing countries’, despite the importance of NDCs’ impact on climate goals.

In the run-up to the five-yearly stocktakes there should be a moment, perhaps a third of the way through the year, where we can see where we stand, individually and collectively, following the NDCs that have been announced.

If some countries’ proposals are weak, those countries should be pressured to do more; if some have not submitted a proposal at all, then that should be highlighted.

The new timeline would look like the one set out in Figure 7 (as at summer 2023).

It seems unlikely that the big economies would agree a formal process change, as when I have suggested such a second stocktake “moment” to various partners they have expressed concerns that it would be controversial. However, civil society should look to create this moment outside the formal process with analysis and media-friendly events which would provide an opportunity to assess (and put pressure on) relative, proposed contributions.

Some civil society organisations have also said that this could pose challenges for them. In particular, I’ve been told that China would potentially close down a given organisation’s activities if they took any part in such a process. This is curious. If China does not care about international criticism (as I was told by the lead of a climate agency), then why would they feel it necessary to threaten such action if their NDC comes under scrutiny?

I have also been told frequently by vulnerable countries that they come under private pressure not to highlight Chinese emissions. China is often the biggest trading partner and investor for these countries.

China’s NDC will be critical in delivering progress towards 1.5° C and it is important that it is examined and challenged alongside those from developed countries, and someone needs to play this role. The natural person to do this would be the Secretary-General of the UN, but I doubt that the current Secretary-General would be prepared to risk offending China in this way.

2. Annex membership

Second, we should review membership of the Annexes to the Convention, which set out who is developed and who is a developing country. We need a step change in support for emerging economies to help them make the transition to low carbon, which is increasingly affordable and will bring them other benefits. This means much more finance from Annex II countries, complemented by finance from China (the world’s biggest sovereign investor) and from Gulf states, who have grown rich on selling fossil fuels.

Sadly, however, I doubt whether it will be possible to negotiate changes to membership of the Annexes, even though that was required by the Convention to happen by 1998. But could countries such as China and the Gulf states not voluntarily step into Annex I and/or even Annex II?

Is it still valid for a country of the size and impact of China to continue to be included in (and arguably sheltering behind) the poorest countries in the world in non-Annex I?

If they aren’t willing to do that, all of us should be very careful in using the term developing country, without being clear that it is a very diverse group with different responsibilities and capabilities.

This matters for many reasons – including because climate action in Europe in particular is going to be very demanding and will be increasingly controversial in some quarters; voices on the centre right are already challenging ambitious net zero targets and it will be even harder to maintain this action and the credibility of the UNFCCC if China is seen to be exempt from pressure and treated on a par with the poorest African country. It also confuses discussion about what will have the greatest impact on achieving climate goals.

For example, the Secretary-General of the UN fell into the trap recently, when highlighting the fact that we will overshoot 1.5 °C, appearing to single out developed countries to bring forward their net zero dates by ten years to 2040 before clarifying that key emerging economies should also look at their net zero dates and bring them forward to 2050. The more fundamental point is that changes to China’s trajectory are much more significant than changes to developed countries’ net zero dates.

Leaving aside the political feasibility of bringing forward Annex I countries’ net zero targets by ten years as called for by the Secretary-General, and the fact that any such changes would need to be heavily frontloaded to minimise the impact on global overshooting of 1.5 °C, there is much more potential for China to do more in the short term (even if that is alongside enhanced Annex I action). For example, China have said nothing about their trajectory in the 2030s and subsequent decades. Some Chinese research institutes have suggested that China should peak its emissions in 2030 and then plateau for five years. If China does choose to peak emissions in 2030 and then plateau emissions until 2035 before heading to net zero, the cumulative difference in emissions could be around 50 Gt compared with peaking in 2030 and linearly declining until 2060. Their decisions matter more than anybody else’s for the climate.

Non-Annex I countries now constitute nearly two-thirds of global emissions and are likely to be a far higher proportion of emissions growth. So if we want to limit climate change, it is these emissions we need above all to target. Of course, we must complement this by quicker action by Annex I countries, perhaps alongside negative emissions, and we must provide much more serious help to some non-Annex I countries.

We need to have these difficult conversations

Some might push back on the analysis above and argue that I am aiming to transfer the climate problem from north to south. I would refute this with four arguments.

First, I have always argued for the most ambitious possible targets by both the UK and the EU and fully agree that rich countries (especially those outside Europe) should have done dramatically more, especially in the decades after 1990. None of the analysis above is intended in any way to diminish the role of those countries.

Second, this book argues for a substantial scaling-up in support from richer countries to emerging economies to enable them to make the transition to low carbon, which in many cases will be cheaper than fossil alternatives over the lifetime of the needed investment, as well as bringing health and energy security benefits for their citizens. Many are keen to move in this direction in any case with the right support.

Third, now that Annex I countries are down to just over 30 per cent of global emissions, it is simply not arithmetically possible to achieve temperature goals without substantial action by non-Annex I countries.

Fourth and last, the picture on historical responsibility is much more complicated than often asserted. Climate change is too important to allow the politics of polarisation (and virtue signalling by some) to get in our way.

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This excerpt was republished with permission from publishers Profile Books. Hard copies are available through Australian distributors Allen and Unwin, available here.